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Aristotle asserts in Metaphysics r, 1003a21ff. that "there exists 
a science which theorizes on Being insofar as Being, and on those 
attributes which belong to it in virtue of its own nature."' In order 
that we may discover the nature of Being Aristotle tells us that we 
must first recognize that the term "Being" is spoken in many ways, 
but always in relation to a certain unitary nature, and not 
homonymously (cf. Met. r, 1003a33-4). Beings share the same 
name "eovta," yet they are not homonyms, for their Being is one 
and the same, not manifold and diverse. Nor are beings synonyms, 
for synonymy is sameness of name among things belonging to the 
same genus (as, say, a man and an ox are both called "animal"), 
and Being is no genus. Furthermore, synonyms are things sharing 
a common intrinsic nature. But things are called "beings" precisely 
because they share a common relation to some one extrinsic nature. 
Thus, beings are neither homonyms nor synonyms, yet their core 
essence, i.e. their Being as such, is one and the same. Thus, the 
unitary Being of beings must rest in some unifying nature extrinsic 
to their respective specific essences. Aristotle's dialectical 
investigations into Being eventually lead us to this extrinsic nature 
in Book A, i.e. to God, the primary Essence beyond all specific 
essences. In the pre-lambda books of the Metaphysics, however, 
this extrinsic nature remains very much up for grabs. 
In Metaphysics T Aristotle refers to beings as "things spoken 
in relation to unity" (TOC Xey6\ieva TTQOC, ev). But it was clearly 
established in Metaphysics B, 998b22jf. that beings are not members 
of a sumwuwi genus. If they were, they would be spoken Kocfr' ev, 
or "under a unity." The reason why Being is no summum genus is 
that, if it were, its essence would repeat itself in the differentiae 
dividing it into subspecies {cf. Met. B998h22ff. & H I045b6). 
Consider the genus Animal. If we divide animals into their various 
species according to habitat (asfundamentum divisionis) we might 
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employ the differentiae terrestrial (i.e. dwelling on land), aquatic 
(i.e. dwelling in the sea), and aerial (i.e. dwelling in the air). These 
differentiae neither imply nor rely upon the generic concept Animal; 
if they did, the division would be logically inadmissible. Now if 
we were to divide Being by taking it as a summum genus resoluble 
into species by means of the categories (understood as differentiae), 
we could never avoid implying the concept of Being in our 
deployment of the differentiae; for we understand Being in terms 
of being-a-substance, being-a-quantity, being-a-quality, etc. In 
other words, the differentiae would, in this case, fail to differentiate 
Being into beings. 
We know that Being is not a genus; but at the same time we 
know that Being is universal quite like a genus. We know that 
beings are spoken in relation to some unitary nature; but we neither 
know what this nature is in itself, nor are we in possession, as yet, 
of a sound scientific method for identifying this nature. All we 
know is that there is an emoxtpri of Being, and that this fact 
implies the further fact that Being is fundamentally ETUOTTITOV. 
There is in the concept of Being qua Being a knowahle core structure 
around which fruitful discourse can be shaped. But we need to 
know what kind of universal Being is, before we can begin to unfold 
the richness of its meaning. 
Fortunately Aristotle provides us with two scientific methods 
for discovering the richness of Being: (1) dialectical term analysis 
and (2) division by analogy. Analogy comes into play scientifically, 
as we are told in Posterior Analytics 98a 1-23, when division by 
genus is not possible. Analogy is an alternative method for dividing 
the subject of investigation when no clearly definable genus is 
recognized for objects of diverse natures. This is precisely the 
case for beings understood as "things spoken in relation to unity." 
For instance, Aristotle claims in Posterior Analytics 98a20-22, that 
analogy is used for discovering a certain unitary nature shared by 
the cuttle-fish's pounce, the spine of an animal, and a bone - three 
things for which there is no common name. "Attributes will follow 
from [these three] as if belonging to a certain unitaiy nature, being 
of such a sort." Aristotle even recycles the Analytics phrasing 
WOTCCQ liictg TIVOQ (puoeox; ("...as if belonging to a certain unitaiy 
nature...") in Metaphysics T1003a34 when he says that the many 
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meanings of "Being" are spoken ngbc, ev KOU piccv n v a (puoiv 
("in relation to unity and a certain unitary nature"). Since Being 
is not a genus, investigation into the nature of Being must proceed 
analogically. 
I propose to examine here the conditions under which 
Aristotle's analogical investigation of Being is possible as science. 
What is it that makes the investigation of Being qua Being feasible 
scientifically, given the dialectical precondition which Aristotle 
himself sets out in Metaphysics r 2, inter alia, for finding a focal 
meaning or primary Being? In other words, does Aristotle 
successfully discover a suitable focal meaning for 'Being'? And 
if so, what is this primary Being? Is it primary ouoicc as discussed 
in the central books, Z and H? Does it involve the notions of 
actuality and potentiality considered in @? Or does it revolve around 
a dialectical treatment of unity-in-itself, as suggested in T, 
reevaluated in K, and analyzed in I? Or does Aristotle's concept 
of Being involve all of these? 
Certainly each strain of analysis represents a viable candidate. 
The medieval schoolmen even held a special place for the concepts 
such as being, one, whole, good, etc. They treated them as highest 
universals.2 And they bestowed upon these concepts the privileged 
appellation "transcendentalia" in the sense that they "ascend 
beyond" Aristotle's list of categories, remain predicable of beings 
across categories, and are not to be contained under any one 
category exclusively. 
I propose here to show that while there is substantial evidence 
to back the legitimacy of substance, unity, and actuality as 
accounting for the nature of Being insofar as Being, Aristotle 
nevertheless radically reassesses their claim to primacy in 
Metaphysics A, 4 &5. I also propose to account for why Aristotle 
recanted his position on the feasibility of universal science in 
Metaphysics r. In the Organon he manifestly discounts the 
possibility of a universal science of Being. While during the 
composition of the Metaphysics he asserts that such a science 
actually exists, as if there were never a problem about its feasibility. 
Scholars in the last half of this century have been divided over 
the issue of feasibility. T. H. Irwin, for instance, emphasizes 
Aristotle's own denial of universal science in the Organon. Irwin 
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thinks that Aristotle's rejection of one comprehensive science of 
the good (E.N. 16 1096a29-34) unavoidably infects the feasibility 
of one comprehensive science of Being: 
At Topica 107a3-I2 (cf. Ethica Nichomachea 
1096a23-9, Ethica Eudemia 1217b26-38, Ackrill 
[1972], 2If) Aristotle argues that goods are 
homonymous because goodness differs according 
to the different categories of being; it is hard to 
believe that he does not intend, here as elsewhere, 
to mark a similar homonymy in beings.. . Just as 
the question 'What is it?' requires a different type 
of answer according to the category of the item 
considered, so also the statement 'x is F' must be 
understood differently according to the category 
of x, and being will be defined differently 
according to the categories.3 
Other scholars, especially G. E. L. Owen, show that Aristotle 
eventually amended his claims in the Metaphysics. Owen argues 
that Aristotle's new found application of 'focal meaning analysis' 
in the Metaphysics is responsible for this change: 
In Metaphysics 1992hI8-24 he says that because 
of this variety in the use of 'onta' it is a mistake to 
engage in a general search for the stoicheia ton 
onton ('elements of existing things', Oxford 
translation). In Metaphysics XIV, 1088b35-
1089b33 he argues this thesis at length (concerning 
'existing things' or 'things that are', O.T.). In the 
Eudemian Ethics 1(1217b25-35) he maintains that 
the same multiplicity shows that there can be no 
single comprehensive science of to on ('being', 
O.T.). In Metaphysics IV (1003a21-b l6 ) , 
resuming the same subject, he amends his claim: 
despite this multiplicity of use there can be a single 
comprehensive science of to on and ta onta, and 
those who looked for the elements of ta onta were 
very likely on the track of this science.*4 
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Owen's contribution, valuable and original though it is, misses the 
fact that Aristotle had already placed analogical investigation 
shoulder-to-shoulder with division by genus as an equally legitimate 
scientific method of discovery in the Posterior Analytics 98a 1-23 
long before he composed the Metaphysics. Owen does not 
adequately account for the cause of the workability of this new 
found application of focal meaning analysis (in Metaphysics i~) 
because he overlooks God as the much-needed linchpin between 
universal and particular. Aristotle's God represents both (1) the 
primary Being, and (2) a universal ideal applicable in formula to 
all beings. God is both that into which all beings collapse qua 
beings, and that out of which all beings derive their essence as 
beings. This makes Aristotle's God both ideal and real, both 
transcending the beings of this world, and disclosing essence in 
the beings of this world. 
In the works comprising the Oraganon, however, Aristotle does 
not apply focal meaning analysis to 'Being' - even though he had 
fully worked out the dialectical mechanics of term analysis -
because he had no theological basis for regarding the concept of 
Being as any thing more than an indeterminate cipher; in other 
words, he saw Being universally as nothing particularly, and 
therefore as not worthy of scientific investigation. For instance, 
he asserts in his refutation of the sophists that "...we ought not 
attempt to grasp the number of things against which those who 
refute do their refuting without scientific knowledge (eTUOTTjiiri) 
of all beings; but this is not the task of one art (TOUTO 6 ' ot> piece, 
e o n xexvricj; for perhaps the are an infinity of sciences, so that 
obviously there would be an infinity of demonstrations as well 
(Sophistici Etenchi 170a20-23)."5 This tone is repeated in Sophistici 
Elenchi 172al3-15 where he denies that all beings fall under one 
genus - a position he would maintain in the Metaphysics as well 
(cf. 998b22, 1045b6) - and again at De Interpretatione 16b22jf. 
where he claims that unqualified Being is an indeterminate 
abstraction significant of nothing in particular, on the grounds that 
when "is" is used without accompanying predicate, it signifies 
nothing at all. 
In the Metaphysics, however, his attention turns to Being. What 
was once regarded in the earlier phase of his career as unknowable, 
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vacuous, and indeterminate through-and-through turns out to be, 
in the Metaphysics, that which the Philosopher asserts to be 
fundamentally imoxr\6v. Owen portrays Aristotle composing 
Metaphysics Fas having "returned to, or newly arrived at, a belief 
in the possibility of a general metaphysics after a period in which 
he had denounced any such project as logically indefensible and 
castigated Plato and the Academy for pursuing it."6 Aristotle claims 
in the Metaphysics that there is a universal science of Being which 
is different from the so-called special sciences "for none of the 
others examines universally about Being insofar as Being 
U003a23)" and also that "...it belongs to one science to theorize 
not only on things spoken K&fr' ev [as under a genus], but on 
things spoken in reference to one nature (Ttgdc, p,uxv cpuoiv); for 
these too are, in a way, spoken of KOCO ' ev" (1003hl2-l5). In the 
Metaphysics Aristotle posits the nqbc, ev analogical universal 
"Being" to be a legitimate object of scientific investigation; 
nevertheless, the analogical method of investigation employed to 
contemplate the universal had already been long established as 
legitimate scientific procedure in the Posterior Analytics. As 
Professor Horst Seidl recently remarked at a recent gathering of 
the Society Aristotelica Jannone, the scientific method of 
investigation and exposition pioneered in the Analytics is applied 
through-and-through to the Science of Being developed in the 
Metaphysics. What changes between the composition of the 
Analytics and the Metaphysics is not Aristotle's attitude about 
division by analogy, but his attitude about Being as such. The 
cause of this change appears to be his discovery of God. 
If Aristotle's God is the focal Entity, the reduction of the many 
meanings of the term "Being" to God will be comparable to the 
many meanings account of (piAioc given in Ethica Eudemia VII2 
where the various senses of 'Friendship' are reduced to one primary 
kind.7 The following passage describes in detail how three different 
forms of friendship (one motivated by utility, another by pleasure, 
and another by excellence, 1236a36-1236bl) are related to one 
central meaning or primary form, but not through an ordinary K a f r ' 
ev reference, nor through chance homonymy, but through TIQO<; 
ev reference: 
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Therefore, there must be three kinds (ei6r|) of 
friendship, but not all so termed under one thing 
(KCCO' ev) as species of one genus (GN; et8rj evdc, 
yevouc,), nor as sharing a name homonymously. 
For these kinds are spoken relative to a unitary 
and primary thing (7CQ6<; piav xiva KCU itQWTrjv) 
(EE 1236a 16-19, my translation) 
Aristotle consciously employs the same dialectical procedure in 
his analysis of 'Being' in the Metaphysics. Look again at this 
passage from Metaphysics P. 
The term "Being" is spoken in many senses, but 
in reference to some unitary nature, and not 
homonymously — just as every healthy thing 
refers to Health, one thing by guarding it, another 
by producing it, another by being a sign of Health, 
and another by admitting of it (Met. 1003a33-b 1). 
These two cases of term-analysis are so similar, in fact, that they 
are linked with the analysis of 'medical doctor' (6 iocTQiKog) in 
the Ethica Eudemia 1236al9. The dialectical method in all three 
cases remains constant: there is an abstract unspecifiable universal 
(e.g. Friendship, Medicine, Being) whose essence is to be 
discovered through analogical reasoning. A primary archetype is 
posited so that the universal's abstract and nebulous nature may be 
contemplated in more concrete terms (e.g. the model friend who 
loves you for who you are and not for pleasure or utility, the medical 
doctor with medical knowledge in his soul, and God, the primary 
Being). Finally, the formula of this archetype must be sought in 
the formulae of all relevant TTQOC, ev relata. The formula of the 
archetype represents an identity of essence within a prevailing 
difference of function and species among the relata. 
As we have mentioned, there was a time when Aristotle did 
not countenance this application of focal analysis to the term 
"Being." For instance, at Ethica Eudemia I. 8, 1218a34-6 that 
which is Good-in-itself is concluded to be of no value for political 
science, and is asserted not to exist." It is the case, argues Aristotle, 
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that each science has value because it produces a peculiar good; 
gymnastics, for instance, produces physical health. By analogy 
only peculiar individual beings exist. There is no Being-in-itself. 
Aristotle regards the Good in abstracto, and by extension Being, 
as too indeterminate to have any scientific value, to merit serious 
scientific attention. G.E.L. Owen, however, lays too much emphasis 
on the priority of ousia in Metaphysics JT, and too little on the role 
of God in A. "It is T, not A," claims Owen, "that moves decisively 
beyond the old polemic, the denunciation of any general inquiry 
into the 'elements of things' which is still audible in Metaphysics 
A."9 Owen says that "in the earlier work <e.g. the Sophistici Elenchi 
and Eitdemian Ethics> that ambitious application [of focal analysis 
to 'Being'] is still to seek."10 And he is right to record this fact. 
But he leaves the role of God as archetype of Being out of his 
account, and places too much emphasis on the priority of substance 
in Met. r, Z, H, and 6>." Because God is, in a sense, both one 
thing and all things, He can serve as both (1) the ev which all other 
beings are TLQ6C„ and (2) the concept whose formula (to apply a 
standard of focal analysis already established earlier in EE 
1236a 1236a 16-33) must be present implicitly in the formula of all 
beings. This dual quality is absent in primary ouoia. Primary 
ouoiai are particular beings, but none stands out as a universal 
primary archetype. Socrates, for example, is a primary oi>oux, but 
not the primary oooioc. 
Thus, the idea that Aristotle simply changed his mind about 
the feasibility of ontology as he matured in his philosophical career 
is well documented, but incomplete. He changed his mind because 
he discovered God. It is not strange to find passages, especially in 
the Topics, Sophistici Elenchi, and De Interpretation which shoot 
down the idea of a comprehensive science of Being due to a 
multiplicity of senses, or to an implicit marriage of reality with 
radical particularity, or because of a supposed inability of science 
to bring all beings under the same set of principles or the same 
genus. 1 2 
Look again closely at de Int. 16b22ff., for instance. Aristotle 
asserts that a verb, uttered just by itself, signifies an activity 
unfolding over time. When it is spoken the speaker arrests his 
thought while the listener pauses, awaiting completion of the verbal 
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idea. But it is not clear whether this activity exists or not "for not 
even the verb 'to be' nor 'not to be' is significant of any reality, 
not even if you say 'Being' without any qualification (i|/iA6v); for 
in itself it is nothing, but signifies some synthesis besides, which, 
without its constituents, is not to be thought."13 
To be, according to this passage, is to be essentially relative to 
and dependent upon determining qualities. When one speaks of 
Being \|nA6v, as Aristotle does in the passage quoted, one has in 
mind existence in bare abstraction. Being, taken i|;iA6v, is bare to 
the world, much as a soldier is bare without protecting armor, or a 
bird stripped of its plumage, or poetry sung without the 
accompaniment of music. Such bare, unadorned Being does not 
signify any reality determinable through the categories. For 
Aristotle, at this stage in his philosophical development, Being in 
itself (qua Being) is significant of nothing in particular. And it is 
just this facet of indeterminability that Aristotle challenges in 
Metaphysics J". There, it seems, "Being qua Being" is another 
way of expressing Being understood ijfiAov (though he does not 
use this adverbial modifier in And this unqualified form of 
Being is at least determinable through necessary logical laws. Being 
understood iJ/iAov, in other words, evolves into the "unqualified 
Being" which is said, in the context of Metaphysics +. 2,1026a33, 
to "have many meanings" (TO 6V TO anX&c, Aeyaiievov Xeyzxai 
TioAAax^c)- The question that we have been trying to answer is 
this: How does the term "Being" come to acquire such a rich 
significance in the Aristotelian metaphysics, when before it 
possessed no significance at all? How does bare unqualified Being, 
for which no meaning nor reality can be found in De Interpretations 
16b22-25, inter alia, transform itself, in the Metaphysics, into that 
which is AeveTOU TtoAAaxwc,? How does 'Being' become a 
dynamic concept with a multiplicity of meanings and senses open 
to philosophical analysis and speculation? 
We can surmise that Being maintains a radical simplicity 
isolated from the particular determinations of the categories. And 
it seems that the turn Aristotle's thinking takes in the Metaphysics 
comes in seeing this simplicity as a positively definable set of 
attributes which manifests itself concretely in a self-absorbed God 
always busy thinking of Himself, and analogically as primary ousia, 
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as potentiality becoming actuality, as a substratum continually 
changing between contrary states. In the Organon, however, 
especially in the passage from Delnt. 16b22f., this same simplicity 
of Being = sheer negation, a cipher, precisely that which cannot be 
thought or made sense of because not classifiable under a category. 
In Met. A, however, there is God. Yet even God appears classifiable 
under the category substance; though his existence transcends the 
categories. But how is this so? How can God's essence both 
transcend the categories, yet be contained under the category 
substance in much the manner that the essence of Socrates (rational 
animal) is contained? The answer must be that Aristotle's God 
maintains both an ideal essence and a real presence in all things 
qua beings. God is the Being of beings, both real and ideal 
simultaneously, both in and out of our world of sense experience. 
In the (early) Organon phase Aristotle maintained a position 
of ontological nihilism: Being universally is nothing particularly. 
The difference in Aristotle's attitude toward Being, and toward 
the feasibility of its systematic study, between the time he writes 
the works of the Organon and SE and the time he composes the 
opening books of Metaphysics r clearly reflects a fundamental 
shift in standpoint. Regardless of the chronology of the works at 
issue, it still holds that the philosopher changed his mind. At SE 
172a 13-15 he denies that beings fall under one genus. He goes on 
to claim that, even if they did, they could never be brought under 
the same set of principles. Yet in a different phase of his career 
Aristotle claims that previous thinkers might just be right in 
asserting that all things are either contraries of composed of 
contraries, and One and Many are the principles (ctQxai) of all 
contraries.14 
C. A. Kirwan, by contrast, suggests that Met. A 10. 1075a28-
34 provides evidence that Aristotle rejected the opinion, held by 
practically everyone at the time, that the physical world is composed 
out of contraries. Kirwan even thinks that the 1005a3-5 passage 
from Met. T2 represents an ad hominem statement, in spite of the 
fact that Aristotle gives absolutely no indication that he is taking 
issue with the idea, and the fact that it enhances rather than detracts 
from the science which he is trying to construct.15 
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The fact is that Aristotle was intrigued with contrary forces in 
nature. In the Physics, for instance, he develops a science which 
studies contrariety in application to kinetic change, i.e. qualitative 
alteration, quantitative growth & diminution, and locomotive 
change (v. Phys. 225b5-6bl7). Each of these classes of movement 
are changes between contraries. Contrariety informs the motion 
of beings. How could this be the theory of a man hostile to the 
idea that the physical world is composed of contraries? Aristotle 
simply adds a substratum to the contraries. Change occurs in a 
substratum between state and privation. But contrariety remains 
essential to physical explanation. And all things may be composed 
of contraries once these contraries are understood to be principles 
and causes of our knowledge of reality', as opposed to material 
causes of things. Many of Aristotle's predecessors made the 
mistake of conflating these two types of cause. 
Furthermore, a closer look at the context of Kirwan's supporting 
text, Met. N 1075a28-34, reveals that Aristotle, rather than taking 
issue with the notion that contrariety pervades all things, is really 
disagreeing with the fallacious views of those who make one 
contrary the matter upon which the other contrary is to rest as form. 
Principally, he chides those who make the unequal matter for the 
equal, and those who make the many matter for the one. Aristotle 
rejects these blueprints in favor of an underlying matter independent 
of the contraries, yet receptive of fonnal change along a continuum 
of qualitative degree of difference stretching from one contrary 
quality to another. 
Kirwan's other supporting text, Met. N 1087a29-b4, does not 
show Aristotle rejecting the view that the physical world is 
composed of contraries, but rather the view that contraries are 
somehow capable of separate existence. Aristotle rejects this 
possibility along with separately existing (Platonic) Forms. The 
Form is universal; and, for the Platonists, maintains a other-worldly 
existence separated off from the particular individuals which 
embody them. For Aristotle, the universal expresses itself in the 
particular individual. In other words, the ideal Form realizes itself 
(i.e. makes itself real) in all of its particular embodiments. Platonists 
believe in ideal Forms which may or may not claim embodiment 
in the particular; thus, Form is separate from matter. For Aristotle, 
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the ideal Form can not exist save insofar as it makes itself to stand 
in the particular. Now the fact that Aristotle's universals and forms 
maintain their existence in the individuals of this world, i.e. exist 
insofar as they are instantiated in concrete particulars, does not 
mean that science lacks universal principles as starting points, it 
just means that these starting points do not have separate existence. 
Kirwan probably misreads Met. 1087a29-b4 as a statement of 
Aristotelian doctrine against any universal ontology which would 
take the One and Many, or some other set of universal principles 
as starting points. Nothing could be further from the truth. Again, 
what Aristotle is rejecting in this passage is much the same idea 
that he rejects at 1075a28-34: that contraries somehow exist 
independently and separate from the underlying subject. 
In sum, Kirwan overlooks that, for a short time, Aristotle 
entertained the view that the contrariety of Unity v. Plurality formed 
co-relative principles of ontology. The passages we have in Tare 
tentative and experimental. In fact, Aristotle departs from the path 
of Unity by choosing the path of primary ousia in the central books, 
then moves on to potency in act, and then finally, rejecting all 
three strands of analysis as mere analogy, goes on to prove the 
unity, substantiality, and actuality of God in Met. A. In other words, 
the three strands of analogy are dovetailed as primary attributes of 
the supreme Being. 
Aristotle simply had not developed the notion of God, i.e. 
primary Essence, understood as the Ideal realizing itself in the 
specific essence of individuals, early enough in his career to allow 
him to apply focal analysis to "Being" in a workable format. 
Without God there would be no cosmic basis of permanence upon 
which to ground the Science of Being. This notion of God as 
primary essence - a supreme Being whose formula is necessarily 
present in the formulae of all beings, qua beings - allows Aristotle's 
new found application of focal analysis in Met. F to flourish. 
Aristotle does not begin Metaphysics F with discussion of God, 
but rather with an abstract and seemingly indeterminate notion of 
Being as such. He then slowly adds layers of determination to it 
by experimenting first with necessary logical laws (FJ-5), elements 
of primary substance (E 2-H), and the notions of actuality and 
potentiality (0) . He then arrives at God as "that which imparts 
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motion without being moved, being eternal, substance, and 
actuality"16; i.e. God is a primary essence, a focus of meaning, 
which gives concrete existence to the abstract notion of Being as 
such. This development is radical indeed. Being qua Being is 
abstract, but God is concrete. Being qua Being is determined 
through equally abstract logical laws; but God is palpable and alive, 
self-aware, and forever actual, though impersonal, self-absorbed, 
and distant. The Metaphysics begins in Twith the unspecifiable 
notion of Being, explores a multitude of meanings of Being, then 
ends in A with the assertion of God's radical oneness, and the 
Homeric line: 
OUK ocYOtftov 7toA,uKoipavuy etc, KOIQOCVOC, eoxca.17 
Rule by the many is no good. Let there be one ruler. 
The emphasis here is clearly on the one beyond the many. To 
understand what beings essentially are, qua beings, we must 
examine a God which transcends the beings of this world. 
But Aristotle's assertion that God is an immaterial "primary 
essence" (Met. A8, 1074a35-6) sounds suspiciously like the 
Platonic assertion of separate immaterial Forms. And it is likely 
that God is the one exception Aristotle grants to his general ban on 
separately existing ideals. Joseph Owens regards Aristotle's God 
as a primary instance universal (cf. 'An Ambiguity in Aristotle, 
EE VII 2 1236a23-4' Apeiron, vol. XXII, no. 2, June 1989, pp. 
127-137; 'The Grounds of Universality in Aristotle', American 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 2, April 1966). But how, one 
must ask, can God be an instance of any concept or idea? If God is 
an instance of Being, albeit the "primary" one, the concept of Being 
would possess a richness beyond God, since other beings also 
instantiate Being, and thereby amplify its meaning. I argue that 
God = Being qua Being. God's essence, therefore, transcends 
categorization, but, at the same time, rests implicitly within the 
essence of worldly finite entities, qua entities. Worldly entities, 
e.g. Socrates, Callias, this reed stalk, etc., are, like God, actual 
unitary substances. But God is not merely a substance; He is 
substance itself. God is not merely an actualization; He is 
actualization itself. God is not merely a unity; He is unity itself. 
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God, in other words, is individual only in the sense that we make 
assertions about Him as a subject having certain attributes. An 
archetype can not be an instance of any concept, lest we suppose 
that concept to be prior in knowledge to said archetype, having a 
richness of meaning which outpaces the archetype. 
On the other hand, Owens may mean that God is a primary 
instance universal in the sense that God represents a locus of 
meaning for beings, qua beings. This notion warrants consideration. 
The meaning or significance of a term like "Being," "medicine," 
or "health" is unspecifiable, since none is a genus, yet there remains 
a primary entity in which the significance of each term is idealized. 
However, God is different from the healthy body and the medical 
doctor, since God exists independently from the beings of this 
world, whereas the healthy body and the medical doctor are to be 
found among the beings of this world. 
In the case of "Being" the primary instance is an idealization 
which explicitly transcends the things of this world, yet remains 
in them insofar as its formula is implicit in the formula of every 
being. In the case of "medicine" and "health" the primary instance 
is any immanent realization which embodies either concept 
respectively. The way to understand what makes instruments, 
bodies, and operations "medical" is to study the art of medicine 
which any medical doctor has in his soul. To study what makes 
things "beings" is to study the supreme Being, not just any being. 
Strictly speaking, there is no supreme medical doctor which exists 
independently of medical things, while there is a supreme Being 
which exists independently of beings. 
There is a similarity between analysis of the terms "Being" 
and "medicine." Just as any doctor represents the nucleus of 
meaning for medical instruments, operations, and bodies, so God 
represents the nucleus of meaning for beings. This nucleus of 
meaning is primary; things whose nature is parasitic on it are 
secondary. Think of Aristotle's virtue-based ethics and the point 
becomes clear. The moderate state of behavior is optimal and 
virtuous, but one may easily stray from moderation through certain 
excesses and deficiencies. For instance, courage is a mean between 
rashness and cowardice; modesty is a mean between shamelessness 
and diffidence. The mean is a model of excellence; it is that in 
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reference to which the extreme forms of behavior, the excesses 
and deficiencies, are known, and possibly corrected. And he who 
acts according to moderation is a model of virtue. But there are as 
many models of virtue as there are virtuous people. There is only 
one model of Being; and this is God. 
Aristotle's pedagogical program in the pre-lambda books of 
the Metaphysics is to furnish a dialectical propaedeutic for students 
in need of templates of argument for both sides of some of the 
foundational questions of first philosophy. When God is brought 
into the picture, first philosophy is identified as theology and 
Aristotle's universal science becomes feasible as study of the divine 
nature. The reason why ontology (i.e. being-study) can only flourish 
as theology is given by the distinction already highlighted. 
Actuality, substance, and unity are universal concepts, but none is 
primary by itself without a supreme Being which exemplifies them 
in the highest degree. That is, there are a plethora of worldly beings 
that are actual, substantial, and unitary - but none is a primary 
instance by itself; just as there is no single medical doctor or healthy 
body which can claim primacy over other equally excellent doctors 
and healthy bodies. Thus, Aristotle's dialectical application of 
focal meaning analysis to the term 'Being' inevitably and 
necessarily results in a Theology which studies a separately existing 
Prime Mover or God, that transcends the beings of this world. If 
there existed a singular ideal Doctor or a singular ideal Healthy 
Body, then medicine and the study of health would also be first 
philosophies! 
What makes first philosophy first among the sciences without 
qualification is that it studies the Prime Mover who exemplifies, in 
the highest degree, the analogical notions of substance, actuality, 
and unity. Aristotle proves this fact by demonstrating three truths 
in Metaphysics A:(\) that there exists in eternal substance, a Prime 
Mover (1071 b3-12); (2) that this Prime Mover is a principle whose 
substance is actualization (107lb 12-22); and (3) that the Prime 
Mover is one both in formula and in number (1074a31-38). At 
Met. A 7, 1072a26-bl God, identified as supreme object of desire, 
is said to be intelligible through the notions of substance, actuality, 
and simplicity (i.e. unity without parts) each of which represents a 
positive notion in Aristotle's double column of contraries.18 This 
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double column recalls another series of contraries mentioned in r 
2. The interconnection of these texts is vital to Aristotle's entire 
dialectical project, because T2 sets up the dialectical requirement 
for a focal entity whose identity as God is not deduced until A 6. 
Once the focal entity is demonstrated to exist, the dialectic over 
the many senses of the term 'Being' comes to an end. All secondary 
senses and instances of 'Being' exhibit pros hen reference to God. 
It is important to see that the deductions presented in Met. A are 
not merely dialectical, i.e. proceeding from reputable opinions to 
some probable truth; they are demonstrations because they prove 
properties of the subject-matter of the science (Theology) itself in 
the same spirit that Euclidean geometry demonstrates the properties 
of triangles and circles. These demonstrations are the beginnings 
of the universal science that Aristotle began looking for in Met. r 
2. 
In Met. A 4 &5 Aristotle shows that the notions of substance, 
actuality, and unity are insufficient as principles, when considered 
analogically, because they differ in application to things located in 
different contexts. Aristotle requires permanent existence. And 
he does not stop until he finds a Prime Mover (A 5, 107 la29) who 
remains the same for all things in all contexts. 
Substance, actuality, and unity represent Aristotle's three layers 
of focal analysis of the term 'Being'. These three aspects are found 
among what I take to be Aristotle's "principles and highest causes 
of beings" (1003a26); so that the Metaphysics constitutes not only 
a series of dialectical responses to the questions raised in Book B, 
a search for a suitable focal meaning for 'Being', but also a search 
for the principles and highest causes of Being. I locate five groups 
of highest principles and causes in the Metaphysics: 
I. Principles common to all science: (1) the common 
doctrines (i.e. necessary logical laws of non-
contradiction (1005bl8-25), identity (1003a22-33), 
and excluded middle, 101 lb23-29), v. Met. r, chh. 3-
8; 
II. Principles unique to first philosophy: 
A. Theological: 
(2) God, "that which imparts motion without being 
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moved, being eternal, substance, and 
actuality" (1072a25), v. Met. A, chh. 6-10. 
B. Ontological: 
(3) Elements of Substance (1070b 16-21): form , 
privation, and matter, v. Met. Z, chh. 1-17; I, 
chh. 1-6; 7 1-5; 
(4) Modalities of Being: actuality and potentiality, v. 
Met. 6, ch. 5; 5, chh. 8-10; and A, ch. 5; 
(5) The Primary Differences and Contrarieties of 
Being (1061 a 12): One v. Many opposition and 
their categorical manifestations in Same v. 
Other (difference in Quality), Equal v. 
Unequal (difference in Quantity), and Like v. 
Unlike (difference in Relation), v. Met. r, ch. 
2; 3, chh. 1-10; K,chh. 2-3. 
In Book A Aristotle argues that groups (3), (4), and (5)— 
substance, actuality, and unity—are to be found in the highest 
degree in the Prime Mover. The concepts of "ontology" gain 
scientific legitimacy by being deduced as properties of God, and 
thus recycled in "theology." 
The "common doctrines" of group (I), says Aristotle (Met. r 
3, 1005b5), must be studied by the philosopher because they 
represent the starting-points for all syllogistic reasoning: 
And so it is clear that it naturally belongs to the 
philosopher who theorizes about all substance to 
investigate also the syllogistic principles; and it 
befits the man who knows most about each genus 
to be able to state the best established principles 
of his subject; so that the man concerned with 
beings qua beings should be able to state the most 
established principles of all things. And this man 
is the philosopher (my translation Metaphysics r 
3, 1005b5-ll). 
Substance, actuality, and unity represent different currents of focal 
analysis. The common doctrines are not part of this kind of analysis. 
106 AUSLEGUNG 
The philosopher studies such doctrines because they must be 
established before intelligible discourse on any subject can begin. 
This includes discourse over the nature of substance, actuality, and 
unity. In Metaphysics A 4 & 5 we see a fundamental reassessment 
of the leading contenders for first principle and cause of all beings. 
These contenders were primary substance (and its elements form, 
matter, privation), intelligible being and unity, along with actuality 
and potentiality. Aristotle intends to show in A that the principles 
and elements of beings previously considered are each insufficient 
as first principles for various reasons. There is clearly a dialectical 
tension in A 4 & 5 produced by the fact that the previous contenders 
provide, through analogy, an intelligible basis for conceiving the 
Being of all there is, but not a separately existing ideal basis of 
permanence. Aristotle's focal analysis has led him into a search 
for an entity that would provide an objective basis of sameness 
and permanence for all there is in the universe. Unity, actuality, 
substance may be sufficient to describe this entity analogically, 
but they are merely intelligible universals acquired by analogy. 
They do not carry a separate nature the same for all things, except 
as attributes of God. 
Here is a summary of Aristotle's A 4 & 5 reassessment of his 
previous currents of focal analysis of 'Being': 
(1) The argument against being and unity as principles 
The intelligible universals being and unity cannot be principles 
and elements of things common to the several categories and prior 
to them, because (a) no element can be the same as the complex 
which includes it, and (b) being and unity are predicable of concrete 
things. Presumably, because the intelligibles, being and unity, are 
not substrata for predication, they are dependent upon the existence 
of some other thing (an individual like Socrates or a species) to 
serve as substratum. The substratum grounds the intelligible form 
much the way God grounds intelligible being and unity (cf. Met. 
1070a35-blO). 
Aristotle has just begun (1070a36-1070b4) his search for a 
cause common to both relations and substances. This common 
cause would be applicable universally across categories. But 
even the most universal of intelligibles, being and unity, do not 
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possess by themselves the kind of independent existence that 
such a cause requires; if they did, they would be Platonic Forms: 
Furthermore, in what manner is it permissible for 
the elements of all things to be the same? For no 
one element can be the same as that which is 
composed of elements; for instance, 'B' or 'A' 
cannot be the same as their composite ' B A \ Nor, 
therefore, can any of the intelligibles, e.g. being 
and unity <serve as an element of things>; for these 
are predicable of each thing, even of composites 
(Metaphysics A 4,1070b4-8, my translation, Ross 
ed.). 
Being and unity can not be the common elements of things by 
themselves because they are predicable of concrete things; they 
are predicated of each entity, even of composites - i>7itfQX£l Y&Q 
xama eicaoTG) KOCI ouvdetoav (1070b8). Being and unity by 
themselves are not things of which concrete things would be 
predicated; it is not the case that "Socrates is Being" and "this reed 
stalk is Unity." These predicates depends upon a subject; and this 
subject can only be God. The undercurrent here is that the 
intelligibles, being and unity, must have existence in the composites 
of which they are predicable; since they can not exist as separate, 
freely-floating Platonic Forms. Being and unity are neither Forms 
nor concrete substrata for predications; if they were, Aristotle would 
no longer need to search for a real basis of permanence in the 
cosmos. 
(2) The argument against form, matter, and privation as 
principles 
Because all sensible things have a form (e.g. heat), a privation 
(e.g. cold), and a matter, we can know by analogy that the elements 
of substance - form, matter, and privation - are the elements of all 
things; but, unfortunately, even these are different across genera 
(Met. 1070b9-21). 
Again, just like being and unity, the elements of substance are 
only common features of all things when considered analogically. 
In reality they differ across genera; that is, the form, privation, and 
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matter for triangles, animal bodies, and celestial spheres is different 
for each genus, but, by analogy, the same: 
Or as we say, there is a sense <in which the 
elements of all things are the same>, and a sense 
<in which they are> not <the same>. For instance, 
perhaps heat is the form of sensible bodies while 
cold is their privation, and matter is that which 
directly, in virtue of itself, is potentially these, 
while these <elements> along with the things 
composed of them, whose principles are these 
<elements>, are substances; i.e. any unity which 
comes to be from heat and cold, e.g. flesh and 
bone; for it is necessary for that which comes to 
be to be distinct from these. Now then the 
elements and principles of these things are the 
same (though different for different things), and 
it is not possible to speak of all things in this way, 
but <it is p o s s i b l o by analogy—just as if 
someone were to say that the principles are three 
in number, the form, the privation, and the matter. 
But each of these is different for each genus. For 
instance, in color these are white, black, and 
surface—or again, light, darkness, and air, for 
from these come day and night (Metaphysics A 
4, 1070b 10-21, my translation, Ross ed.). 
The elements of substance take on different realizations in different 
contexts; and so, are not absolutely the same for all things. For 
instance, color is a genus comprising a continuum of varying 
degrees of color. There are extremes at both ends of the continuum, 
but there is also an intermediate. The matter in which the contrary 
extremes pass into and out of existence is surface, i.e. any surface 
of any object. The form - privation - matter sequence is played 
out differently in different genera. The genus human body 
comprises the contrariety of hot and cold. And the matter in which 
these contraries are found constantly replacing each other is, as 
Aristotle says, flesh or bone. It is tempting to think that Aristotle 
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wishes to get rid of form, privation, and matter (along with being 
and unity) because of their variability in application to things. But 
this would be a mistake. Aristotle wants to save them by finding 
an entity which would exemplify the principles of substance and 
unity in the highest degree by serving as a basis of permanence for 
everything in the cosmos. 
(3) The argument against actuality and potentiality as 
principles 
By analogy, says Aristotle, the principles of things are the same, 
for instance, actuality and potentiality; but these too, like form, 
privation, and matter, are different for different things in different 
circumstances (Met. 1071a3-ll) . By analogy actuality and 
potentiality are principles. But, once they are applied to a host of 
real objects existing in different genera, they fail as common factors 
because they lack the separate existence required to allow them to 
function as ontological points of reference for all things potential 
and actual. Notice at the beginning of the following passage the 
recurring theme of substratum v. predicate. The latter depends 
upon the former; if we are to grasp the principles and elements of 
things these must be independent in existence. Affections and 
movements do not exist without substances. And analogical notions 
like actuality and potentiality depend upon the substrata of which 
they are predicable. There is a sharp division between permanence 
and change in the following passage. The soul and body, or, 
alternatively, the intellect, desire, and body (1071 a3), are suggested 
as permanent principles. But, again, affections and movements of 
substance, actuality and potentiality differ from entity to entity: 
Since, on the one hand, there exist separate 
entities, and, on the other, non-separate entities, 
the former will be substances. And for this reason 
the causes of all things will be the same, because, 
without substances, affections and movements 
would not exist. Perhaps then these will be soul 
and body, or intellect, desire, and body. And yet 
in another way, by analogy, principles are the 
same; for instance, actuality and potentiality. But 
these are different for different things in different 
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contexts. For in some cases the same entity will 
at one time exist in actuality and at another time 
in potentiality; e.g. wine or flesh or man. (And 
these fall under the aforementioned causes; for, 
on the one hand, both the form—if it is not 
separate—and the composite, and the privation 
(e.g. darkness or sickness) exist actually, but the 
matter only potentially; for it represents the 
potentiality for becoming both. But the distinction 
between actuality and potentiality assumes a 
different shape for things whose matter is not the 
same and whose 1 9 form is not the same but 
different; just as the elements serve as the cause 
of a man—fire and earth as matter along with an 
individual form—and, in addition to these, 
something else outside, e.g. the father, and besides 
these the sun and its slanting orbit, these being 
neither the matter, nor the form, nor the privation, 
nor the same species as man, but rather moving 
causes (Metaphysics A 5, 1070b36-1071al7, my 
translation, Ross ed.). 
Aristotle is searching for a substantial permanence to physical 
change. He even briefly speculates that perhaps this substantial 
basis of permanence is soul and body, or perhaps intellect, desire, 
and body. In A 6 he concludes, however, that there must be an 
eternal prime mover. The motivation seems to be that in too many 
cases the same thing is both actual and potential. E.g. Socrates is 
potentially whatever he is when considered according to matter, 
but actually whatever he is when considered according to form. 
That is, different aspects of the same substance are at the same 
time actual (as form) and potential (as matter). Furthermore, when 
cause and effect have not the same matter the distinction between 
actuality and potentiality differs dramatically. The father of 
Socrates is a moving cause which has a different parcel of matter 
than the sun, which is another moving cause. The sun and the 
ecliptic are neither Socrates' matter, nor his form, nor the privation 
of that form; they are remote moving causes which allow Socrates 
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to flourish in life. So, perhaps, it is not even accurate to limit the 
elements and causes of Socrates to just the matter, form, and 
privation present in his person. But if so, where does the regress 
of outside causes and principles cease? Aristotle's point here is 
that actuality and potentiality differ when applied to individuals in 
different contexts. He seems to question the objectivity of these 
notions. If they differ in different circumstances, how can they 
serve as standards of knowledge? Aristotle seeks something that 
will remain the same in reference to any thing in any context. The 
passages we have looked at from Metaphysics A 4 & 5 make the 
radical suggestion that all previous efforts expended in the 
dialectical search for the principles and starting points of existence 
have been in vain; for none has brought the philosopher to a 
separately existing, self-sustaining, substantial basis of permanence 
in the universe. 
Each of the three arguments from Met. A chh. 4&5are designed 
to show that the principles he thought to be universally applicable 
to all beings by analogy, are really not the same for all because 
they lack permanent independent existence. They are just as suspect 
to criticism as Platonic Forms because they too lack a principle 
productive of movement and change. In short, we need a separate 
and permanent entity that is common across genera, and is at the 
same time productive of cosmic movement. The intelligibles being 
and unity, the elements of substance, and actuality & potentiality 
do not satisfy the requirement of separate existence across genera; 
for things in different genera manifest different kinds of matter, 
different kinds of unity, and so forth. Only an eternal substance, 
whose existence is proven at 1071b3-12, satisfies both of these 
requirements in full. 
Aristotle's ontology, i.e. his study of the various senses of 
"Being" ends in Met. A ch. 6 where he begins to demonstrate certain 
properties of the divine nature. The trend in recent scholarship is 
to treat Book A a separate treatise on the divine nature; so that 
Theology may be cleanly separated from Ontology. But such 
treatment belies the fact that Aristotle's God, as a ideal basis of 
cosmic permanence which realizes itself in the being of things, 
stands at the end of his dialectic of senses as the only suitable focal 
entity. First Philosophy is Theology; for, in studying the nature of 
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the divine, one thereby studies that in reference to which all other 
things are called "beings." 
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Notes 
'This and all subsequent translations of Aristotle's Greek are my own, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
2Ralph Mclnerny interestingly divests study of Being from the 
rigorous requirements of demonstrative science outlined in the Analytics 
because he, like St. Thomas, wants to see it as the ruling science, and 
hence as excepted from the parameters governing the ruled sciences; see 
Review of Metaphysics 47 (September 1993): 3-18. There is, however, 
no textual evidence that I know of which shows that Aristotle changed 
these parameters in order to suit ontology because he regarded it as the 
master science. Being is no genus to be sure. But God is a particular 
individual substance with deducible properties. In fact, there are a plethora 
of deductions proving the eternity, actuality, and unity of God in 
Metaphysics A. Each possesses the rigor of demonstration (a7t66ei£ic,). 
In Posterior Analytics 1,13 Aristotle regards knowledge of the that to be 
demonstrable as he does knowledge of the why or reasoned fact (cf. 78a30 
and 36). St. Thomas believed that the existence of God could be proven 
by His effects, through demonstratio quia—i.e. proof of the fact that He 
exists where the middle term is more known to us—but never (as Euclid 
proves his several propositions) through first causes, by demonstratio 
propter quid—i.e. proof of the reasoned fact where the middle term is 
more known by nature, i.e. rests on an axiom or definition more known 
than and prior to the conclusion. 
3T. H. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 500, 3n8. C. A. Kirwan 
would disagree: "[The idea that no science can have all existing things as 
its subject because of the multiple senses of 'exist'] is suggested by an 
analogy between 'thing-that-is' and 'good' which Aristotle draws at 
Nichomachean Ethics 16.1096a29-34, where he argues against Platonists 
that different kinds of knowledge or expertise are required to discover 
e.g. what is good in war and what is good in medicine: there could not be 
such a thing as a general knowledge of what is good which would short-
cut these particular studies. But it is a mistake to suppose that this analogy 
raises a difficulty in the way of the inquiry examined in Metaphysics f. 
The question about existence which parallels the Platonic question 'what 
is good?' is 'what exists?'; and, while it is true to say that there is no 
single discipline that includes answers to such questions as 'do electrons 
exist?' and 'does conscience exist?', metaphysics, according to Aristotle's 
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conception of it, makes no claim to be such a discipline. It seems, then, 
that Aristotle was troubled by a needless anxiety. No danger lurks in his 
concession that the senses of 'be' are multiple, if that concession is based 
on the analogy between 'thing-that-is' and 'good'", Aristotle's 
Metaphysics Books T, A, and E, p. 80. 
4G. E. L. Owen, 'Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology', Logic, Science, 
and Dialectic, collected papers in Greek Philosophy by G. E. L. Owen, 
Martha Nussbaum, ed. 
5Sophistici Elenchi, I. 9,170a20-23, Ross ed. 
6G. E. L. Owen 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of 
Aristotle', During ed. Studio Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, no. 11, 
1960, p. 164. 
7For a lengthier treatment of the dynamics of focal meaning analysis 
see T. H. Irwin, 'Aristotle on Homonymy' Review of Metaphysics, 1981 
vol. 34, pp. 523-44. And Julie K. Ward, 'Focal Reference in Aristotle's 
Account of OiAioc: Eudemian Ethics VII 2' Apeiron, pp. 183-205. 
8'Oxiu.£vouvoi)K£axiv amo xi kyafiov, exei CCTIOQIOC, xoiauxac, 
Koct oxi oi> x Q ^ ^ o v Tfi TCoAiuKfje aXk' i8tdv xi ayctfrdv, 
&cmeQ KOU xaic, aXAaige oiov yunvaoxiKf) Eunice, ££ / .£ , 1218a33-
36, Rackham ed. Aristotle wants to show here that the Good-in-itself has 
no practical value in political science. Each science is useful because it 
produces its own peculiar good. Thus, I translate "Such are the difficulties 
showing that there exists no Good-in-itself, and that it is not useful for 
political science, but that there exists instead only a peculiar good, just as 
the other sciences <have their own peculiar goods>; for instance, the 
<peculiar good> of gymnastics is physical health." 
9Ibid., Owen, (During 1960), p. 181. 
,0Ibid., Owen, (During 1960), p. 170. 
1 'Cf. Joseph Owens, 'Is There Any Ontology in Aristotle?', Dialogue, 
vol. XXV, no. 4, Winter 1986, pp. 697-707. 
I 2T. H. Irwin rejects universal ontology in Aristotle because Being, 
since it is not a genus (as often emphasized by Aristotle himself, esp. 
Met. 998b22-27, 1053b22-23; Top. 144a36-b3), lacks the kind of lcafr* 
ev unity Irwin supposes as requisite for first-order scientific treatment 
(Ibid. Irwin, ch. 8.86 p. 161). Charlotte Witt follows Irwin closely on this 
point in Substance and Essence in Aristotle, p. 28. Walter Leszl seems to 
anticipate both views, Aristotle's Conception of Ontology, p. 175). All 
three, as we have seen, implicitly deny any universality beyond the 
categories. 
13My translation covers Delnt. 16b22-25, Minio-Paluelloed.: ou yaq 
xo eivoti r) u.f| BIVOCI ormeidv eoxi xou nQ&y\i(X,xoc, ou5' E&V 
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eurr|c, i|nA6v (xmb u,ev yag OU8EV souve 7tQoaor)u,(Xivei 6e 
ouveoiv n v a fjv aveu xdv OUYKEIU.EVG)V OUK EOTI vofjoai. 
Aristotle's last sentence ending "OVK eon vofjoai" recalls Parmenides 
both metrically and philosophically (Diels-Kranz Fragment B 2.2): (XITIEQ 
6801 pouvai 8iCiioid^ eioi vofjoai. Aristotle's sentence at Delnt. 
16b25 ends, like a typical hexameter line, with a dactyl and a final spondee. 
Beginning a prose sentence with the end of a hexameter verse is acceptable, 
but never ending a sentence; unless one wishes to emphasize a special 
point or allude to someone else. This rhetorical fine point is found in 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, de Thucydide where Thucydidean prose 
rhythm is discussed. Aristotle's denial of the existence of unqualified 
Being also responds to Parmenides' two paths of thought: namely, (1) 
that Being exists, and that it is impossible for it not to exist (DK Fr. B 2.3) 
and (2) that Being does not exist, and that it is necessary for it not to exist 
(DK Fr. B 2.5). The latter path is, of course, not feasible for Parmenides 
because "neither can you come to know non-Being (for this is not to be 
accomplished), nor can you utter it" DK Fr. B 2.7-8. Aristotle clearly 
disavows the former path, since "to be" functions in thought only by 
connecting subject and predicate in a kind of semantic synthesis, or in the 
completion of a verbal idea. 
"Metaphysics T, 1005a3-5. 
, 5C. A. Kirwan, Aristotle: Metaphysics Books T, A, and E, Oxford, 
1971, p. 85. 
l6Metaphysics A, 1075a25. 
llIliad 2, 204. Susemihl omits EOTG), which is missing from most 
MSS. But as Ross remarks (vol. 2,405) it would be particularly easy for 
the last word of a book to drop out in the archetype. 
l8The privations corresponding to the positive notions of substance, 
actuality, and simplicity (i.e. intrinsic unity) are, presumably, accident, 
potentiality, and multiplicity (i.e. intrinsic plurality). These privations 
are not part of the Divine nature. 
19I depart from the Ross edition by reading Kal d)v (107la 12) as 
found in the commentary of Themistius, instead of uv <evicov>. 
